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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
In Appellee's Brief, Teresa Guss ("Guss") recites the allegations in ^| 9 of the First
Amended Complaint that each of the defendants, Cheryl, Inc. ("Cheryl") and Derek
Edvalson (ccDerek") were negligent. (Record ("R.") 36-42) Guss does not, however,
describe the allegation in ^[ 8 of the First Amended Complaint that when Guss was
leaving Cheryl's premises, "Derek Edvalson, acting for and on behalf of Cheryl, Inc.,
attempted to pick up the wheelchair in order to put the Plaintiff in her vehicle." This
allegation of vicarious liability summarizes Guss's claims against Cheryl.
In the Appellee's Brief, Guss provides an incomplete description of the reasons
Cheryl moved for summary judgment. In the memoranda supporting the Motion for
Summary Judgment, Cheryl moved for summary judgment on two grounds: (1) there
was no evidence that Cheryl caused Guss's injury, even if Derek was subject to liability,
since Cheryl was not Derek's employer and Cheryl's owner and employees were not
assisting Guss at the time of the injury; and (2) Cheryl could not be held vicariously
liable tor a Derek's negligence as a volunteer and the fact that a parent-child relationship
between Cheryl's principal and Derek did not subject Cheryl to vicarious liability. (R.
52-152).
In the Appellee's Brief, Guss cites arguments in her memorandum opposing
Cheryl's Motion for Summary Judgment that Cheryl was "independently negligent" and
that Cheryl was subject to liability "irrespective of his employment relationship."
Although Guss did not cite any supporting authority, nor explicitly argue, that Cheryl was
subject to primary and direct liability for asking a volunteer to assist Guss, the trial court
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rejected any argument other than vicarious liability to deny summary judgment.
Specifically, the sole reason that the trial court denied summary judgment was that "this
is a factual question for the jury to determine whether the son is a volunteer helping his
mother in her business and, therefore, the business should be liable, or could be liable."
(R. 925).
Guss argues that "no instruction discussed any consequence of finding Derek to be
a volunteer." After the district court's order denying summary judgment for the sole
reason that a jury would have to decide the fact question whether Derek was a volunteer,
and after Guss's settlement with Derek a week before trial, Guss should have known that
a finding by the jury that Derek was a volunteer would mean that the claims against
Cheryl would be dismissed. There cannot be any dispute that Guss knew Cheryl would
seek dismissal of all claims, if the jury found that Derek was a volunteer, since Cheryl
began closing argument by seeking relief under Interrogatory No. 6. In Appellee's Brief,
Guss contends that it has reviewed the citation to the record in Appellant's Brief to
confirm that Cheryl "made no reference to Derek's status as a volunteer barring recovery
against Cheryl." This contention is absolutely wrong.
The Special Verdict had seven questions, including Interrogatory No. 6, which
provided as follows:
Considering all of the evidence in this case, please determine from a
preponderance of the evidence your conclusion that defendant, Derek
Edvalson, was an employee of Cheryl, Inc., or a volunteer.
Employee
Volunteer

922739 1

X

2

Beginning with the second sentence of Cheryl's closing argument and continuing
through the sixth sentence Cheryl specifically discussed Interrogatory No 6 and the
dispositive effect of a finding that Deiek was a volunteer, as follows
[Y]ou cannot allow someone to keep suing for helping the disabled
we've got to encourage people to help the disabled, if it's not your job,
that's the key thing here Derek was not doing his job
You'll see on the special verdict that you're going to be given the
question halfway through, which again is more than half-way through,
two-thirds of the way thiough, which is going to seem out of place, that's
got negligence, cause, negligence, cause, for each of the parties and then it
asks you to determine from the preponderance of the evidence whether
Derek Edvalson was an employee or a volunteer Why9
Well, because if you help the disabled as an employee for work,
you'd better know what you're doing If you're doing it as an act of
kindness, you should not be sued if something goes wrong
(R 952, Volume 3 of the Trial Transcript 516-17)
Guss did not object to Cheryl's explanation to the jury in closing argument of the
effect of a finding that Derek was a volunteer Pnoi to trial, Cheryl submitted
Interrogatory No 6 as part of its proposed Special Verdict form (R 676-749) Guss did
not submit any proposed instructions or Special Verdict which described the effect of a
finding m Interrogatory No 6 that Derek was a volunteer Guss did not object to the jury
instructions and Special Verdict submitted by Cheryl before trial that omitted an
explanation of the effect of Interrogatory No 6
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The only reason that Cheryl was not dismissed by summary judgment was that the
district court held that the jury was lequired to determine the factual question of whether
Derek was a volunteer In filing the motion to revise the order denying the motion for
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summary judgment, Cheryl justifiably relied on Interrogatory No. 6, which decided in
Cheryl's favor the only unresolved issue used to deny the summary judgment motion.
The trial court's order denying the motion to revise the summary judgment meant that the
trial court disregarded and nullified the finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a
volunteer.
Guss has not cited any authority supporting her theory that a party who requests
thai a non-employee assist a customer into her car subjects the requester to liability.
Allegations that Derek had been improperly trained, or that a business which asks an
employee, family member, or bystander to assist a customer cannot deny any
responsibility for a negative outcome, do not entitle Guss to judgment against Cheryl.
Cheryl submitted Interrogatory No. 6 based on the trial court's order denying the
summary judgment motion. Interrogatory No. 6 uses words with plain meanings that do
not require further definition. In the event that Guss contends that the meaning of
Interrogatory No. 6 required further description or definition, it was obligated to object to
Interrogatory No. 6 or to submit additional jury instructions.
The district court and Guss did not offer any reasonable explanation for the reason
that Interrogatory No. 6 was included in the Special Verdict if the district court intended
to enter the same judgment against Cheryl, regardless of whether Derek was found to be
an employee or volunteer. At trial, Cheryl had no reason to object to the Special Verdict,
since the trial court had not defeated the effect of Interrogatory No. 6. Based upon the
order denying summary judgment and the decision to include Interrogatory No. 6 in the
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Special Verdict, the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard and nullify the
finding that Derek was a volunteer.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE VERDICT FOUND THREE PERSONS WERE NEGLIGENT,
BUT THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 54(b)
MOTION WHOLLY DISREGARDED AND NULLIFIED THE
FINDING THAT DEREK WAS A VOLUNTEER.

In Argument I of the Appellee's Brief, Guss argues that, because the verdict found
that two parties and a non-party were negligent, the motion filed by Cheryl on March 16,
2009, to revise the decision denying summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)
(the "54(b) Motion"), was Cheryl's attempt to disrupt the verdict. By filing the 54(b)
Motion, however, Cheryl sought just the opposite result. Specifically, the 54(b) Motion
requested that the trial court ensure the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6 was not
wholly disregarded and nullified in the final judgment. In addition, Cheryl was required
to submit Interrogatory No. 6 to the jury in accordance with the district court's order
denying summary judgment, since the court ruled that the sole reason it denied Cheryl's
dispositive motion was that there was a "factual question for the jury to determine"
whether Derek was a volunteer. In Interrogatory No. 6, the jury determined this factual
question in favor of Cheryl by finding that Derek was a volunteer, but in denying the
54(b) Motion the trial court refused to give effect to the jury's finding.
When Cheryl filed the Motion for Summary Judgment almost two years before
trial, Cheryl contended that it was entitled to be dismissed as a defendant on the ground
that, as matter of law, it was not subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of Derek.
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The only reason that Cheryl was not dismissed by summary judgment, was that the
district court held that the jury was required to determine the factual question of whether
Derek was a volunteer. In filing the 54(b) Motion, Cheryl relied on the jury's decision
which made the exact finding Cheryl had sought in the summary judgment motion, but
the denial of the 54(b) Motion meant that the trial court ignored the jury's finding, despite
its summary judgment ruling that a finding Derek was a volunteer would be dispositive of
all claims against Cheryl.
The importance of a finding by the jury that Derek was a volunteer is best
demonstrated by the fact that Cheryl gave extraordinary emphasis to Interrogatory No. 6
by making it the first argument in closing argument to the jury. Beginning in the second
sentence and continuing through the sixth sentence, Cheryl specifically argued to the jury
that Cheryl cannot be sued by Guss if Derek was not assisting Guss as a job, but as a
volunteer. Similarly, Cheryl asked numerous witnesses at trial whether there was any
evidence that Derek was an employee, including Guss, and none of them offered any
testimony to support Guss's claim that Derek was an employee.
In Argument I of the Appellee's Brief, Guss asserts that Cheryl's appeal is
disingenuous and, in support of the assertion, she recites closing argument by Cheryl
where counsel argued that, if the jury decided damages should be awarded, negligence
should be allocated to the two parties and the non-party listed on the Special Verdict.
Cheryl concedes that it did not object to the jury instructions and Special Verdict which
provided that negligence would be apportioned to the two parties and the non-party. This
apportionment was essential in the event that the jury found that Derek was an employee
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of Cheryl, since Cheryl would have been vicariously liable for Derek's negligence. By
contrast, the apportionment had no legal effect once the jury found that Derek was a
volunteer.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to disregard and
nullify Interrogatory No. 6 and give effect to the jury's finding by entry of summary
judgment dismissing Guss's vicarious liability claims against Cheryl.
B.

GUSS HAS NOT ALLEGED ANY FACTS OR LAW THAT
SUBJECT CHERYL TO LIABILITY FOR DEREK'S ASSISTANCE
OF GUSS AS A VOLUNTEER.

In Argument II of Appellee's Brief, Guss argues that it provided sufficient notice
of her claims against Cheryl for claims of independent negligence. Cheryl disagrees that,
even if Guss pled a claim for independent negligence, she was entitled to proceed to trial
on an independent negligence cause of action, after the trial court denied summary
judgment by ruling that the sole fact question to be decided concerning Cheryl's liability
was whether Derek was a volunteer. Nevertheless, nowhere in Appellee's Brief does
Guss discuss any legal principles that would subject Cheryl to liability for the negligent
acts of a volunteer. Guss cites arguments made in opposing Cheryl's summary judgment
motion that Derek had been improperly trained or that a business which asks an
employee, family member, or bystander to assist a customer cannot deny any
responsibility for a negative outcome. There is, however, no citation to any authority that
a party which requests that a non-employee assist a customer into her car subjects the
requester to liability for failure to train the volunteer. Moreover, Guss has not recited any
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evidence showing that Cheryl was assisting Derek when he lifted Guss at the time she
was injured.
Under Utah law, a volunteer cannot subject an employer to vicarious liability.
E.g., Glover v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996) (an employer cannot
be held vicariously liable for the torts of a volunteer). If a so-called employer was not
assisting a volunteer at the time the volunteer injured a customer while the customer was
being transferred into her car, the employer cannot be liable.
In seeking summary judgment, Cheryl cited authority which provided that a party
may be subject to vicarious liability for the negligence of an actor "who voluntarily aids
another" under the multiple elements recited in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323.
E.g., Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 21 P.3d 667 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Guss did not, however, request any jury instructions or Special Verdict interrogatories
pertaining to this doctrine and, in denying summary judgment, the trial court did not
order that Guss was entitled to proceed to trial under this theory. Guss cannot seek
recovery under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 where the jury did not receive
instructions concerning the elements of the claim and these elements were not proven at
trial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b) (issues not raised by pleadings shall be treated as though
they had been tried, but only if they were tried by express or implied consent of the
parties).
In summary, the fact that Cheryl requested that Derek assist Guss does not subject
Cheryl to liability, unless Derek was Cheryl's employee.
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C

GUSS HAD THE OBLIGATION TO SUBMIT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND A SPECIAL VERDICT TO EXPLAIN THE
EFFECT OF INTERROGATORY NO. 6.

In Argument II of the Appellee's Brief, Guss complains that Cheryl did not object
to the omission of a legal explanation of Interrogatory No. 6 in the jury instructions or
Special Verdict form. Of course, as Guss concedes in her Brief, it would be absurd for
Cheryl to object to Interrogatory No. 6, because Cheryl submitted the jury instructions
and Special Verdict form. Cheryl did not consider it necessary to submit any further
definition of terms with plain meanings like "employee" and "volunteer." Cheryl does
not agree that the jury instructions or Special Verdict required a definition of "vicarious
liability" or that Cheryl had an obligation to describe the effect of Interrogatory No. 6. If
Guss contends the jury instructions and Special Verdict were incomplete, she should have
objected to them, but she did not.
In accordance with the trial court's order denying summary judgment, a jury
verdict finding that Derek was a volunteer would necessarily require dismissal of Guss's
claims against Cheryl. Thus, Guss was entitled to submit an explanatory jury instruction
or, perhaps, a statement in the Special Verdict, describing the dispositive effect of
Interrogatory No. 6. Analogous authority for Guss to provide a jury instruction
explaining the effect of Interrogatory No. 6 was provided by the comparative fault
instruction submitted to the jury. In particular, Instruction No. 17 was given to the jury
by the trial court to instruct the jury that, if the jury allocated 50% or more of the total
fault of all parties listed on the verdict form to Guss, "then Guss would recover nothing."
Instruction No. 17 is identical to a model Utah jury instruction, but there is no reason that
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Guss could not have provided a similar warning of the effect of Interrogatory No. 6, if
Derek was found to be a volunteer. Guss did not submit any additional instructions or
object to Interrogatory No. 6.
Although Guss contends that Cheryl failed to object to the trial court's failure to
give jury instructions necessary to explain Interrogatory No. 6, it was Guss's obligation
to object to any incomplete jury instructions.
D.

GUSS HAS NOT OFFERED A REASONABLE EXPLANATION OF
HOW THE TRIAL COURT GAVE EFFECT TO
INTERROGATORY NO. 6 IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT AND,
THEREFORE, CHERYL WAS ENTITLED TO DISMISSAL.

In Argument III of Appellee's Brief, Guss disputes that Cheryl is entitled to
reversal of the judgment, or a new trial, for the district court's failure to give effect to
Interrogatory No. 6. Specifically, Guss argues that the Special Verdict was not
inconsistent and, if it was, Cheryl failed to preserve its right to seek reversal of the 54(b)
Motion or a new trial. Guss has not, however, made any effort in her Brief to offer a
reasonable explanation for how the trial court gave effect to Interrogatory No. 6. At the
end of Argument III, Guss's only discussion of the reason the trial court failed to consider
Interrogatory No. 6 in the entry of judgment was that "[t]he only consequence of this
response is that Cheryl is only responsible for the negligence attributed her, and is not
responsible for any negligence attributed to Derek. Ms. Guss didn't object to this
question because it would not bar her recovery, but would clarify whether Cheryl was
only responsible for her actions/negligence or whether she would be responsible for
Derek as well." This argument does not make sense, because Derek settled a week

922739 1

10

before trial and was a non-party. Accordingly, upon finding Derek to be a volunteer,
there was no conceivable way that Cheryl could be liable for any negligence attributed to
Derek. Indeed, the effect of Derek's settlement with Guss was that the 20% in
negligence attributed to Derek in the Special Verdict reduced Guss's recovery of
damages by 20% in the final judgment.
Based on the trial court's order denying summary judgment, Cheryl requested
Interrogatory No. 6 in the Special Verdict, examined numerous witnesses concerning the
evidence showing that Derek was not an employee, and devoted the most important part
of the closing argument to Interrogatory No. 6. The denial of the 54(b) Motion, however,
meant that the judgment entered against Cheryl was not different in any way, because
Derek was found to be a volunteer and not an employee. The district court decided that
Interrogatory No. 6 should be completely disregarded and nullified by entering judgment
against Cheryl. There is no way to know why the District Court submitted Interrogatory
No. 6 to the jury, if it intended to enter the same judgment against Cheryl, regardless of
whether Derek was found to be an employee or volunteer.
After the jury found that Derek was a volunteer in Interrogatory No. 6, Cheryl
justifiably expected the district court to give equal effect to all of the findings in the
Special Verdict by dismissing Guss's claims consistent with its order denying summary
judgment. If the trial court had granted the 54(b) motion, Interrogatory No. 6 would have
been harmonious with other interrogatories and all seven interrogatories would have had
equal priority. E.g., Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 869 (Utah
1981) (a jury's answers to special interrogatories must be read harmoniously); Heno v.

922739.1

11

Sprint/United Management Co., 208 F.3d 847, 854 (10th Cir. 2000) (there is no priority of
one jury answer over another). Only when the district court denied the 54(b) motion by
failing to give meaning and effect to Interrogatory No. 6 was there a reason for Cheryl to
object to the Special Verdict. In other words, at the trial, Cheryl did not object to the
Special Verdict, since the trial court had not defeated the effect of the finding in
Interrogatory No. 6. See First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454
P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) (in rendering judgment for plaintiff, the trial court does not
have the prerogative to defeat the effect of a jury's findings that are favorable to
defendants); Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913, 916-17 (Utah
1979) (the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard or nullify a jury's findings
favorable to the defendant).
Cheryl should not be barred from seeking reversal of the order denying the 54(b)
Motion, or a new trial, for the failure to object to the Special Verdict at trial, where
Cheryl did not know the district court would fail to give effect to Interrogatory No. 6,
until the 54(b) motion was denied. If the trial court did not intend to give effect to a jury
finding that Derek was a volunteer, it should have removed Interrogatory No. 6 from the
Special Verdict. The district court's decision to include Interrogatory No. 6 in the
Special Verdict meant that once Cheryl obtained a favorable finding that Derek was a
volunteer, the trial court did not have the prerogative to disregard and nullify the finding.
CONCLUSION
This Court should remedy the failure of the trial court to give any meaning and
effect to the jury's finding in Interrogatory No. 6 that Derek was a volunteer. Therefore,
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Cheryl respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying the
54(b) Motion or, alternatively, order a new trial.
DATED this

'

day of March, 2010.
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC

^

By.

ivAngus Edwards
Jessica P. Wilde
Attorneys for Defendant, Cheryl, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ 4 _ day of March, 2010,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
William R. Rawlings
11576 South State Street, Suite 401
Draper, Utah 84020
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